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THE USE OF POST-ACQUISITION EVIDENCE IN
SECTION 7 CONGLOMERATE MERGER CASES
In recent years, section 7 of the Clayton Act' has been wielded
with vigor by the Federal Trade Commission in its attack upon conglomerate mergers.' As the assault has been pressed against untested
combinations, the courts reviewing the Commission's actions have
faced difficult questions concerning the weight to be given evidence
depicting the affected markets after the merger. This issue, which
was somewhat ambiguously treated by the Supreme Court recently in
FTC v. ConsolidatedFoods Corp.,3 seems likely to face the Court again
1 Prior to amendment in 1950, the essence of § 7 was:

[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so
acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line
of commerce.
38 Stat. 731 (1914). The remainder of the statute established exceptions to this rule,
including an exception for acquisitions made purely for investment.
The amended statute, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), the heart of
which is quoted in the text accompanying note 5 infra, applies to asset acquisitions
as well as stock acquisitions, prohibits all mergers whose effect will be "substantially
to lessen competition," rather than just those which lessen competition between acquiring and acquired firms, and refers only to commerce in any section, of the country.
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
For commentary on this revision, see Hernacki, Mergerismn and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 20 GEo. WAsHa. L. Rtv. 659 (1952) ; Comment, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 1212
(1951); Comment, 46 IL. L. REv. 444 (1951).
2 In the FTC's petition for a writ of certiorari in the Procter & Gamble case,
it was argued that
the Commission's limited resources for merger enforcement are heavily committed to conglomerate mergers involving firms in related product lines. It
recently found one unlawful in General Foods Corp., 3 CCH Trade Reg.
Rep., [ 17,465, relying heavily on its opinion in the instant case. An earlier
decision invalidating a similar merger was affirmed in Ekco Products Co.
v. Federal Trade Commission, 347 F.2d 745 (C.A. 7). See, also, Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 309 F.2d 223 (C.A. D.C.); cf.
Federal Trade Commission v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592. And
the Commission has a number of other, similar acquisitions under active
investigation with a view to issuance of formal complaints.
Petition for Certiorari, pp. 9-10, Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th
Cir.), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 897 (1966).
The Department of Justice -has concurrent authority with the FTC to enforce
§ 7 if it chooses to file a complaint in the appropriate district court. S. REP.
No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950). The Federal Trade Commission has been
the main watchdog over conglomerate mergers, however, and this Comment will consider post-acquisition evidence in the context of FTC investigation only.
3 380 U.S. 592 (1965). See text accompanying notes 37-45 infra.
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in the pending case, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.4 This Comment
will illustrate the usefulness of such post-acquisition evidence, examine
some of the difficulties engendered by its use and suggest some guidelines by which the courts might review such use by the FTC.
THE USEFULNESS OF POST-ACQUISITION EVIDENCE

Section 7 of the Clayton Act,' as amended in 1950, provides in
relevant part:
[N] o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Initially, it should be noted that all mergers challenged under this
statute are subject to the same standard: whether "the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly." This standard was designed by Congress "to
cope with the monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before
they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act
proceeding." 6 In implementing this intent, however, Congress did not
outlaw mergers in which there is only a "mere possibility" of injury.
An acquisition is not within the reach of section 7 until there is a
"reasonable probability" of the proscribed effects. 7 By thus dispensing
with the necessity of proving actual harm, section 7 demands a prediction; the Commission must forecast future anticompetitive effects
which are likely to be caused by the merger.' Since by definition a
prediction entails an element of uncertainty, this legislative decision
means that in the course of preventing many undesirable mergers, a
few mergers that would not eventually have proven to be harmful will
also be prevented. Given the desirability of minimizing this chance
4385 U.S. 897 (1966), granting cert. in 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966). The FTC
in the petition for certiorari attacked the Sixth Circuies reasoning in attaching
"great weight to the post-acquisition evidence in the record." P. 14. See the discussion of this evidence in text accompanying notes 48-49 infra.
5 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
6 S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
7Id. at 6. Any requirement of certainty or actuality of injury would obviously
be inconsistent with Congress' effort to supplement the Sherman Act by stopping
the proscribed consequences before harm can be done.
8 The Commission, in making its determination, must act in conformity with the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (Supp. -), and the findings
of the Commission as to the facts are to be conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1950).
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of error, evidence of the actual effects of an acquisition might be helpful
in estimating its true potential.' That is, where the pre-merger information about the merging companies and their markets is susceptible
to a variety of plausible inferences about the potential impact of the
merger, the post-acquisition history may tend to demonstrate that
certain of these possibilities have materialized and are likely to continue,
but that other possibilities are unlikely to materialize. For example, if
one set of reasonable pre-acquisition inferences forecasts the likelihood
that television advertising economies will substantially increase the
market power of the merged firms, evidence of the failure of an intensive
promotional campaign significantly to affect the market would tend to
9 If the probabilities of a merger had to be judged at the time of acquisition,
any use of post-acquisition evidence might seem to be logically irrelevant since what
happens after a merger does not change what the probabilities were at the time of
acquisition. In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957), however, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the reasonable
probabilities imust be measured at the time of acquisition. Mr. Justice Brennan,
speaking for the Court, noted:
To accomplish the congressional aim, the Government may proceed at any
time that an acquisition may be said with reasonable probability to contain a
threat that it may lead to a restraint of commerce or tend to create a monopoly
of a line of commerce. Even when the purchase is solely for investment,
the plain language of § 7 contemplates an action at any time the stock is used
to bring about . . . the substantial lessening of competition.
Id. at 597-98. Thus, in cases where the Government claims the reasonable probability
exists at the time of suit, post-acquisition evidence is as relevant as pre-acquisition
evidence in measuring the probabilities.
Moreover, even when the Government's suit is predicated upon the theory that
the probability existed at the time of acquisition, a strictly logical exclusion of postacquisition evidence is too extreme. Since it is often difficult to recognize a merger's
true probabilities purely on the basis of pre-acquisition evidence (see text accompanying notes 17-26 infra), post-acquisition evidence would seem to be relevant to the
extent that it "relates back"-i.e., it reveals what the probabilities were at the time
of acquisition. Authority for this proposition is found in Mr. Justice Burton's dissent
in du Pont. Although Mr. Justice Burton strongly disagreed with the majority's
opinion that "time of suit" rather than "time of acquisition" was controlling, he did
acknowledge that post-acquisition evidence "is relevant to the extent that it bears on
the central question whether, at the time of acquisition, there was a reasonable
probability of a threat to competition." 353 U.S. at 625.
It is still uncertain how far the FTC will attempt to carry the "time of suit"
interpretation. Some doubt was cast upon the vitality of the doctrine by the second
Procter & Gamble opinion:
[T]he ineffectuality of a wait-and-see policy on the part of the agencies
charged with the enforcement of Section 7 should be obvious. If the agencies
postpone the commencement or completion of the action challenging a merger
in order to see what trends or results will stem from it, they thereby disable
themselves from obtaining or granting effective relief. It bears repeating
that an order divesting corporate assets that were acquired a long time before
the issuance of the order rarely advances the policies of Section 7.
Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE RIm. REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder) 1116,673, at
21,574-75 (FTC 1963).
For commentary supporting the "time of suit" interpretation, see, e.g., Stedman,
The Merger Statute: Sleeping Giant or Sleeping Beauty, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 567,
576-85 (1957); 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 120, 122 (1958); 106 U. PA. L. REv. 116, 120-23
(1957). For commentary disapproving the "time of suit" interpretation, see Manne,
The Perplexing Dit Pont Case: Additional Confusion in the Law of Mergers, 106
U. PA. L. REv. 385, 393-94 (1958) ; The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 H~av. L. REv.
85, 167-68 (1957) ; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1251, 1259-66 (1957).
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undermine the strength of such inferences. This is not to say that postacquisition evidence will always or even often be so helpful, but where
it does accurately demonstrate some potential of the merger it may
reduce the chance of predictive error.
It would seem that post-acquisition evidence would have its greatest utility where a conglomerate merger is involved. While such evidence might also be helpful in analyzing horizontal or vertical mergers,' °
judgments as to these mergers can be more accurately made on the
basis of pre-merger evidence than can judgments as to conglomerate
mergers." The difference in predictive accuracy is largely attributable
to the pre-merger market contact that characterizes horizontal and
vertical mergers. This phenomenon is absent in conglomerate mergers
since, by definition, a conglomerate merger involves firms that have
not been related as competitors or as buyer and seller.
In the horizontal and vertical cases, the pre-merger relationship
of the acquiring and acquired firms facilitates the expression of probabilities in quantitative terms. For example, in a horizontal merger,' 2
if the present market is shared equally by five firms, the merger of
firms A and B can be readily seen as likely to result in AB's possessing
40% of the market if both firms simply maintain their present activity.
Similarly, in a vertical merger,' 3 if five sellers equally share a market
and buyer X constitutes 40 & of that market, the probable result of
buyer X's merging with seller A is quickly demonstrable: whereas B,
C, D and E formerly competed with A for all the market, X is now
likely to give its entire business to A, thereby foreclosing B, C, D and
10 See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv.
L. REv. 1313, 1315 (1965). Turner distinguishes among the three types of mergers
-horizontal, vertical and conglomerate-in the following manner.
[W]e may define the area of conglomerate mergers as all acquisitions other
than (1) acquisition by a producer of the stock or assets of a firm producing
an identical product or close substitute and selling it in the same geographical
market-the simple horizontal merger; and (2) acquisition of the stock or
assets of a firm that buys the product sold by the acquirer or sells a product
bought by the acquirer-the simple vertical merger.
The variety of conglomerate mergers ranges from the pure conglomerate, involving no discernible economic relationship between the merging companies, through
several kinds of "mixed conglomerates," which evidence indirect horizontal or vertical
relationships. For examples of mixed conglomerates, see note 17 infra.
"1In comparing the three categories of mergers, Turner concludes that in a
conglomerate merger the anticompetitive effects "can rarely if ever be so obvious
or so certain" as in the case of horizontal mergers and some cases of vertical mergers.
Id. at 1321-22.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
1 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, suipra note 12; United States v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); cf. Reynolds Metals Co. v.
FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (vertical integration involved in merger,
but FTC's § 7 finding not based on this factor).
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E from competing for that 40% share.1 4 Whether or not this emphasis upon market shares is appropriate as the sole measure of the
legality of horizontal and vertical mergers, it is clear that "the Supreme
Court has come to place important if not decisive weight on the share
of the relevant markets controlled by the acquiring and acquired
companies." 15 An approach predicated upon the analysis of market
shares is not possible in conglomerate merger cases, however, because
market shares in two unrelated markets do not lead to the same inferences that can be drawn from market shares in the same or a
vertically related market.'" Examination of the tests used by the FTC
in Procter & Gamble will illustrate this point.
In 1957, Procter & Gamble Company, the nation's largest producer of domestic cleansers, purchased the total assets of the Clorox
Chemical Company, the dominant manufacturer of liquid household
bleach. This acquisition constituted a product-extension merger,' 7 the
acquisition by one producer of a noncompeting but complementary
producer, with possibilities of research, production and marketing
integration. 8 After five years of hearings and appeals, the FTC-in
a seventy-four-page opinion by Commissioner Elman-ordered divestiture.' 9 The FTC concluded that the merger would be likely to have
'4 The vertical judgment is slightly more difficult than the horizontal judgment
because foreclosure will only result if X changes its buying habits; the trier must
assess the likelihood of this change. See Turner, supra note 10, at 1321-22.
15Id. at 1315. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441,
459-62 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 278-80
(1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364-66 (1963);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). But see United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (Court's emphasis almost entirely upon the
number of firms in the market rather than the market shares of any particular firm).
10 Turner, supra note 10, at 1316, after noting the use of market share figures in
horizontal and vertical cases, concludes that "whatever significance can be attached
to market shares in these cases, quite clearly the significance becomes less when we
deal with conglomerate mergers, and indeed may completely vanish."
17A product-extension merger is only one type of conglomerate merger. Other
"mixed conglomerate" characteristics include: 1) market extension-the acquisition
of a firm producing the same product as the acquirer but selling it in another market,
see, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); 2) reciprocity-a buyer's conditioning his order upon the seller's purchase of the products
of the buyer's merged subsidiary. See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380
U.S. 592 (1965). Similar to a conglomerate merger is a "joint venture," the intercorporate formation of a third corporation designed to fulfill economic needs of the
two parent corporations. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378
U.S. 158 (1964).
18 In the Procter & Gamble-Clorox merger, the major possibilities of integration
were at the marketing level. Liquid detergent bleach, a caustic soda solution, is
5Y4% hyperchlorite and 94/4% water. The manufacturing process is relatively
simple, but the weight of the product, which must be shipped in liquid form, reduces
the feasible shipping radius to 300 miles from the point of manufacture. The major
economies of this merger would allegedly be realized in advertising expenditures
since Procter & Gamble, the nation's largest advertiser in 1957, was already skilled
in marketing low-cost domestic cleansers. Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d
74, 79 (6th Cir. 1966).
'9Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder) if
16,673
(FTC 1963). This was the second time the Commission had acted upon the Procter
& Gamble case. In a 1961 appeal by Procter & Gamble, the Commission had remanded
the case to the trial examiner for the gathering of post-acquisition evidence. Procter
& Gamble Co., 58 F.T.C. 1203 (1961). See note 47 infra.
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three principal undesirable effects: 1) increased concentration in the
bleach industry by virtue of Procter & Gamble's superior financial resources; 2) decreased possibilities of future deconcentration in the
bleach industry due to raised entry barriers; and 3) the removal of a
significant restraint on Clorox's anticompetitive conduct by virtue of
the elimination of Procter & Gamble as a potential competitor." Clearly
an assessment of such probabilities on the basis of pre-merger evidence
necessitates theoretical judgments uncalled for in horizontal and vertical
cases. Determination of the likelihood of "increased concentration" 21
requires analysis not just of market shares, but of the importance of
capital and technique in improving market performance, the availability
of Procter & Gamble's applicable resources and the willingness of the
acquirer substantially to divert these resources. Employment of the
entry barrier test 2' involves speculations as to the previous barrier,
the added retaliation potential resulting from the merger and the degree
to which this increase will deter possible new entrants.' The potential
competitor test condemns the removal by merger of Clorox's most
feared potential competitor-Procter & Gamble-when Procter &
Gamble's presence outside the market had restrained Clorox from exploiting its market position.
The difficult inferences which must be
drawn in order to apply the potential competitor test include: whether
:0 Reply Brief for Respondent, p. 4, Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d
74 (6th Cir. 1966). Commissioner Elman discusses these effects in Procter & Gamble
Co., 3 TRADE RFG. REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder) 16,673, at 21,575-86 (FTC 1963).
21 For commentary on the anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects of a conglomerate merger upon present competitors, see Blair, The Conglomerate Merger
in Economics and Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672, 679-94 (1958) ; Turner, supra note 10, at
1322-62.
2 For an extensive discussion of the entry barrier problem, see BAIN, BARRIERS
To NEv COmPEIrTION (1956).
2- Turner, in discussing the likelihood and consequences of a conglomerate
merger's raising the barriers to entry into an industry, observes that "it is virtually
impossible to estimate the probabilities of significant adverse effects upon entry."
Turner, supra note 10, at 1356.
24 There are actually two possible ways in which the removal of potential competition may have an anticompetitive effect. The effect mentioned in the text results
because the dominant firm no longer fears inducing entry by presenting too attractive
a market picture. It therefore begins to exploit its monopolistic advantages. Turner
finds this the most persuasive reason for outlawing a conglomerate merger if three
preconditions are present: 1) the market must be an oligopoly, 2) the outsider must
have been recognized as one of few likely entrants, and 3) the price level at which
entry would be induced must not be above the profit-maximizing level. Once these
minimum conditions have been established, however, the problem of proving substantiality remains, and Turner acknowledges that "in the absence of the kind of direct
proof found in El Paso [the market-extension merger cited in note 17 supra], it
obviously becomes more difficult to determine the existence and substantiality of the
competitive influence of a firm not actually selling in the market." Turner, siupra
note 10, at 1371.
The other way in which the removal of potential competition by merger may have
an anticompetitive effect is if the outside firm would have entered the market by
internal expansion but for the merger. See id. at 1362-86. Throughout the Procter
& Gamble proceedings there is confusion between these two effects, but in its petition
for certiorari, the FTC emphasized the first effect, removal of a deterrent to anticompetitive behavior. Petition for Certiorari, pp. 15-17, Procter & Gamble Co. v.
FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 387 U.S. 897 (1966).

1967]

POST-ACQUISITION EVIDENCE

Clorox was in fact restrained by its lower-priced competitors rather
than by potential entrants; whether Procter & Gamble was regarded
as a threatening entrant to the point of restraint; and whether there
are other firms-e.g., Colgate-Palmolive-which might fill the same
role after the merger.
Adding to the difficulty of assessing the probable consequences
of a conglomerate merger is the fact that many of the tests attempt in
part to measure psychological reactions2 5 For example, the entry
barrier is not merely the investment needed to gain recognition in the
present market; that amount is affected by the fact that present competitors will intensify their competitive efforts to resist the intrusion
of the new competitors. Thus in part the effect of an entry barrier
depends upon an "outsider's" assessment of an "insider's" reaction to
new competition. Similarly, the restraining influence of a potential
competitor upon a present competitor's conduct depends upon the
present competitor's judgment of the point at which the potential competitor will think the market attractive enough to warrant entry. In
this latter situation, the psychological factor is an "insider's" judgment
of an "outsider's" reactions. Consequently in both the entry barrier
test and the potential competitor test, measurements of future psychological factors are crucial to a section 7 prediction. Such measurements are not easily made on the basis of the pre-acquisition evidence
available at an FTC hearing.
Thus it would seem that in conglomerate merger cases, the inferences to be drawn from pre-merger evidence are both more various and
more tenuous than in horizontal and vertical merger cases, and the
chances of predictive error are correspondingly higher. If post-acquisition evidence which accurately speaks to the potential of the merger were
available, it would be especially useful in conglomerate merger cases.
There is a strong argument, however, that too thorough an investigation of economic evidence in pursuit of maximum accuracy may result in great inefficiency of administration without greatly reducing the
chances of predictive error. 8 This argument rests primarily on the
25 In its second opinion, the Commission carefully noted:
[T]he conditions which retard competition in an industry are to an important
degree psychological. They stem from competitors' appraisal of each other's
intentions, rather than from the intentions--or the actions taken upon themthemselves.
Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRAE REG. REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder) f 16,673, at
21,579 (FTC 1963). See Blair, supra note 21, at 690, 692-93 (discussing psychological effect on present competition) ; Turner, srupra note 10, at 1357 (entry barriers
are "largely a psychological phenomenon") & 1364 (discussing the mechanics of
"potential entrant" deterrence). But see id. at 1353-54 (suggesting that where the
industry is already highly oligopolistic, the effect on the behavior of present competitors is unlikely to reduce competition).
26 For the leading treatment of this issue, see Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act
and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226 (1960). Professor
Bok urges the development of simple, clear rules designed to reduce the complexity
of investigation. For a discussion of rules that might be used for conglomerate
mergers, see Turner, supra note 10.
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premises that: a) the adversary system is not well suited to the analysis
of complex economic theories and statistics; b) even if all the relevant
economic standards were assembled, economists as well as lawyers lack
the knowledge to make sophisticated predictions; and c) in view of
(a) and (b), the marginal value of broadening the scope of inquiry
is minimal."
The argument concludes that the danger of choking the
administrative process with too much evidence may be especially great
with respect to post-acquisition evidence since the relationship of particular effects to a particular merger is likely to be obscure. 8
Balancing considerations of administrative efficiency against the
possible usefulness of post-acquisition evidence, however, does not require excluding all such evidence merely because some of it would not be
helpful. A section 7 attack upon a merger is an extraordinary proceeding; it enables the government to order divestiture without any proof
that such a combination has been, or necessarily will be, harmful. A
prediction made on the basis of almost incomprehensible economic data
is sufficient to deprive a corporation of any benefit from a carefully
planned multi-million dollar transaction and to force that corporation to
disentangle assets which may have become greatly intertwined. To deny
the corporation the use of all post-acquisition evidence may subject it to
a most severe penalty when an examination of what actually happened
after the merger might clarify an admittedly obscure mass of pre-merger
inferences. This is not to say that a corporation should be allowed to
postpone a hearing in order to accumulate such evidence, but rather
that if helpful evidence is available, it should be used. The problem
of administrative inefficiency should be solved by strictly confining the
use of post-acquisition evidence to the circumstances in which it will
be genuinely reliable.
THE WEIGHT

To BE GIvEN POST-ACQUISITION EVIDENCE

There are two major circumstances in which post-acquisition
evidence should not be afforded any weight in a section 7 case. The
first is when it does not accurately reflect the effect of the acquisition
because it is not responsive to the trier's test, i.e., it is not probative.
The second is when it does not accurately reflect the effect of the
acquisition because it has been manipulated so as to present a misleading impression.
Probativeness
As with all other evidence, post-acquisition evidence must be
probative before it can be given weight by the Commission. In a
section 7 case, if evidence is introduced to illustrate the anticompetitive
effect of a merger, it is probative only if that effect would not have
2

7 Bok, vipra note 26, at 228, 238-47, 287-99.

28 See Commissioner Elman's opinion in Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRaDE: REr.

REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder)

16,673, at 21,574 (FTC 1963).
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occurred but for the merger. For example, if the FTC alleges that
the effect of the merger is the lessening of deconcentration possibilities
by virtue of a raised entry barrier, evidence that no new firms have
entered the market is probative-tends to prove the allegationonly if it can be shown that new firms would have entered but for
the merger. Similarly, if the effect to be shown is increased concentration, evidence that several competitors have dropped out of a
market after a merger is probative only if it can be shown that such
firms would not have dropped out had there been no merger.
Evidence introduced by the respondent in defense of a merger
must also meet the test of probativeness. A corporation will often
introduce post-acquisition evidence in an attempt to demonstrate the
error of the FTC predictions. Since section 7 does not demand certainty or actuality of injury, evidence merely showing that anticompetitive effects have not yet materialized is not, in itself, probative.
Only evidence tending to show that the FTC predictions are unlikely
to be realized in the future speaks genuinely to section 7's purpose of
stopping restrictive practices in their incipiency. For example, evidence
introduced at an FTC hearing two years after a merger, depicting no
increase in the market share of the merged firms, is responsive to the
"increased concentration" test only if the trier can reasonably infer from
it an improbability of future increased concentration. 9
Evidence depicting "active" consequences contrary to the trier's
prediction lends itself more easily to a responsive inference than does
evidence of "passive" consequences. For example, if the corporate
respondent attempts to rebut an allegation of probable increased concentration by introducing evidence of the failure of an intensive advertising and price-cutting campaign, the inference that future concentration increases are improbable is stronger than if the respondent
simply shows that two years have passed with no anticompetitive effects.
Manipulation
The corporate respondent's position in using post-acquisition evidence is strikingly different from that of the government. The government is an "outsider" utilizing evidence of what happened after the
merger to substantiate a prediction of anticompetitive consequences.
On the other hand, the respondent is an "insider" utilizing the actual
effects of an acquisition to refute the prediction. The position of the
respondent as one in control of evidence makes such evidence suspect
because of the possibility that the respondent has restrained himself
merely for purposes of proof.
29The same considerations apply to all evidence merely showing an absence of
the alleged effects, though it would seem that the longer the period of absence, the
stronger should be the inferences which can be drawn from mere absence of anticompetitive effects.
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Manipulation in this context does not mean that the respondent
will introduce evidence which it knows to be untrue, such as doctored
financial statements. Rather we are dealing with the possibility that
the corporation, knowing that it was under investigation, has refrained
from exploiting its market position, thereby making the post-merger
record misleading as to the true probable effects of the merger.3
It does not follow from this premise that all evidence favorable
to the respondent is suspect because of the possibility of manipulation31
Evidence that was not within the control of the accused, such as a
competitor's conduct, obviously could not have been manipulated.
Such evidence should be admissible.32 Conversely, if post-acquisition
evidence reflects a pro-competitive change so substantial that the value
of the investment is seriously jeopardized, such evidence should also
be admissible. In such a situation, the chance that manipulation has
occurred seems slight.
The bulk of post-acquisition evidence, however, is still open to
the suspicion of corporate restraint. There are four possible ways in
which the admissibility of such evidence can be treated: 1) the FTC
must conclusively prove the evidence to have been manipulated; 2) the
FTC must prove that it is more probable than not that the evidence
was manipulated; 3) any evidence designated "suspicious" by the FTC
is rebuttably presumed to have been manipulated; 4) any evidence
designated suspicious by the FTC is conclusively presumed to have been
manipulated.
The first alternative seems unrealistically severe in view of the
subtle nature of the proof required; it is an almost impossible task to
prove conclusively that a company deliberately restrained itself in its
course of conduct. 3 Lowering the standard to "more probable than
not," as in the second alternative, is not much better. The evidence
which would be needed by the government to demonstrate that intrafirm decisions and orders were made with deliberate restraint in fear
of section 7 proceedings is within the power of the company. Any
company desirous of influencing post-acquisition evidence would have
30 It is also possible that the pre-merger record could be manipulated in anticipation of a merger. Two circumstances make this unlikely: a) the absence of internal
control over both merging companies, and b) less awareness of § 7 vulnerability.
The combination of these two circumstances means that the preparation of a favorable
evidentiary framework would require comprehensive cooperative planning, making
the proof of suspected pre-merger manipulation less difficult than proof of postacquisition manipulation. Such cooperation between two firms might also violate the
Sherman Act "restraint of trade" provision. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
81 Concern over manipulation should be restricted to evidence favorable to the
acquisition.
82 Even this approval must be used with caution, however, since it is conceivable
that a competitor's conduct was possible only because the merging company refrained
from retaliating in order to make the merger appear harmless.
83 See, e.g., McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 318, at 675 (1954); 9 WiGmoRE EviDENCE
§ 2486 (3d ed. 1940).
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little difficulty making evidence of such intentions unavailable. Thus
the result of either the first or the second alternatives would be to
admit a great amount of unreliable post-acquisition evidence. In addition to the danger of inaccuracy, there is the substantial risk that the
administrative process may choke on its own consumption of evidence. 4
Though the fear of choking the administrative process is not in itself
a sufficient reason generally to exclude probative post-acquisition evidence, it certainly weighs against a liberal policy of admitting evidence
that is already inherently suspicious.
But if a presumption that evidence has been manipulated should
be available to the FTC, we must still consider whether that presumption should be rebuttable or conclusive. While a conclusive presumption at first glance seems unduly strict, there are good arguments
in its favor. Allowing a company to attempt to demonstrate that the
favorable evidence within its control has not been manipulated may
be opening a Pandora's box of proofs. The amount of available postacquisition evidence is often overwhelming, and the efficient administration of section 7 could be frustrated by liberal rules of evidence that
would delay resolution of these cases by creating unwieldy records.
One of the reasons for not placing the burden of proof on the FTC
in section 7 cases was to preserve the prophylactic purpose of the
section by ensuring prompt processing of complaints. Allowing respondents to introduce the subtle proof required to show an absence
of manipulation may be letting in through the window what was shut
out at the door.
On the other hand, in view of the usefulness of post-acquisition
evidence in conglomerate merger cases,3 5 it would be putting a heavy
burden on respondents to force them to rebut section 7 accusations
without the chance to use important evidence merely because it might
have been manipulated. The vast bulk of probative post-acquisition
evidence is subject to the merging companies' control and thus, at
least, colorably suspicious. In view of the FTC commitment to antitrust prosecution,386 allowing the Commission unilateral, conclusive
determination of this issue may well mean denying corporate respondents use of their most effective weapon without any opportunity
to demonstrate its legitimacy. Stripped of their defenses, the merged
firms would be forced to retreat to a battle of economic theories and
conjectures about the future. This development hardly seems consistent with a desire to reduce to a minimum the amount of speculation
inherent in a section 7 judgment.
Consequently it would appear that the potential usefulness of postacquisition evidence controlled by the respondents outweighs the need
34 See text accompanying notes 26-28 mzpra.
35 See text accompanying notes 10-24 supra.
36 See note 2 mtpra.
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for expedience to the extent that the FTC should be allowed only a
rebuttable presumption. Since the burden of showing an absence of
manipulation is an extremely difficult one, the effect may be to prevent
respondents from using most of the post-acquisition evidence available
to them. This result is perfectly consistent, however, with the desire
to protect the efficiency of the administrative process while giving the
respondent the chance to use those crucial pieces of reliable evidence
that may protect his investment against an erroneous prediction.
The Cases
The Supreme Court has been faced with the question of the use
of post-acquisition evidence in a conglomerate merger case only once,
in FTC v. ConsolidatedFoods Corp.3 7 As noted earlier,"8 it is difficult
to draw definite conclusions from that decision. In Consolidated
Foods Corp., 9 the FTC had disallowed the acquisition of Gentry, Inc.,
an onion and garlic producer, by the Consolidated Foods Corporation,
a food processor and distributor. The Commission found that the
market structure resulting from the merger raised a substantial
probability of reciprocity, and that consequently the merger violated
section 7. Reciprocity is essentially the result of a firm's saying to
one of its suppliers, "I will not buy from you unless you buy some
of your supplies from my subsidiary." o On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the divestiture order was not
supported by substantial evidence. The decision relied heavily upon
ten years of post-acquisition evidence. 4
The majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas, stated that, while it was not improper for the lower court to
consider post-acquisition evidence, too much weight had been given to
such evidence in this case:
No group acquiring a company .

.

. is entitled to a "free

trial" period. To give it such would be to distort the scheme
of § 7.

.

.

.

If the post-acquisition evidence were given

37 380 U.S. 592 (1965). For commentary on this case, see Donnelly, The Supreme
Court-The Federal Trade Commission and the Not-So-Conglomerate Merger: An
Analysis of Federal Trade Commission v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 43 U. DEr. L.J.
35 (1965); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 181-85 (1965);
Note, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 1019 (1966).
3s See text accompanying note 3 supra.
39 3 TRADE REG. RE'. (1961-63 Transfer Binder) 1116,182 (FTC 1962), rev'd,
329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
40 See, e.g., Harsha, The Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity-Condemned by
Conjecture?, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 201 (1964) ; Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the
Antitrust Laws, 77 HARv. L. REv. 873 (1964) ; Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 93 (1964) ; Turner, supra
note 10, at 1386-93.
41 The court of appeals' opinion concluded: "Probability can best be gauged by
what the past has taught. We are convinced that the Commission has mistakenly
rejected what the record demonstrates as to the past in favor of a future possibility
based on conjecture and speculation." 329 F.2d at 627.
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conclusive weight or allowed to override all probabilities,
then acquisitions would go forward willy-nilly, the parties
biding their time until reciprocity was allowed fully to bloom.4 2

It is uncertain just why Mr. Justice Douglas characterized the postmerger period as a "free trial" period. 3 The kernel of his thought
is apparently contained in the phrase "the parties biding their time
until reciprocity was allowed fully to bloom." Despite the difficulty of
understanding this phrase in the context of the passage, the thrust of
the majority's concern would seem to be that the "clean record" presented by the first few post-merger years might blind the trier to the
true potentiality of the acquisition.- Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, was far more concerned with the need for such

evidence:
No one gives the company a "free trial" by assessing, in light
of what actually happened, what could only be hypotheses
at the time the merger occurred. Without post-acquisition
evidence, the trier is faced with a blank slate and untested
speculation. . .
We may be sure that the Commission
relied on post-acquisition factors in issuing its order; there is
no reason why we should rely on those factors less in assessing the propriety of the Commission's action. Indeed, if
anyone had a "free trial" period to check the anticompetitive
potential of the merger, it was not the respondent but the
Commission. 4 5
380 U.S. at 598.
Donnelly, supra note 37, after extensive analysis of the Consolidated Foods situation, concludes that Mr. Justice Douglas attempted to bring about a compromise
between the FTC and the court of appeals. The Commission had urged in its brief
that the thrust of § 7 was at market structure, not market behavior, and that postacquisition evidence was only admissible either to buttress a conclusion of anticompetitive structure or to show that the alleged anticompetitive effects would be impossible within that structure. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 47-49, FTC v. Consolidated
Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). See generally Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE
REG. REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder) %16,673, at 21,572-74 (FTC 1963). On the
other hand, the court of appeals had emphasized the behavior following the merger:
"No substantial impact on the relevant market occurred, and absent some factor
which requires a different approach we are of the view that the experience reflected
by this post-acquisition period must weigh heavily in appraising future probabilities."
329 F.2d at 626.
43 See The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HAv. L. REv. 56, 183 (1965), which
suggests that Mr. Justice Douglas' statement implies that post-acquisition evidence
may be used to prove the illegality of a merger, but not its legality.
44 See also Donnelly, supra note 37, at 66-67, 77-78, suggesting that the Court,
dealing with an unfamiliar problem, "quite properly refrained from stifling future
development by spelling out in its own opinions at too early a stage the precise
standards for judging the lawfulness of such mergers." Id. at 78. Donnelly further
suggests that the Commission may be able to reconcile the Court's demand to consider post-acquisition behavior with the basically structural approach developed by
the FTC in its opinions in Procter & Gamble and Consolidated Foods, and in Reynolds
Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743 (1960), aff'd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
45 380 U.S. at 606 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Stewart concurred on the
basis of evidence that the smaller food processors shifted orders to Consolidated in
response to the influence of reciprocity. This evidence was not referred to in the
majority opinion.
42
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Thus, Mr. Justice Stewart fears not that the trier will be blinded by
looking at a "clean record," but rather that a trier will be blinded to
the extent that he must rely on "untested speculation" without the
guidance of the actual results of the merger.
The suggestions concerning probativeness and manipulation discussed above would seem to accommodate the concerns of both the
majority and concurring opinions in ConsolidatedFoods. The danger
of a "free trial" period is mitigated by the strict requirement of
probativeness, and by allowing the FTC a rebuttable presumption
against the admissibility of any evidence thought to have been manipulated.4 6 On the other hand, any post-acquisition evidence that really
speaks to the future probabilities of the merger is available to substantiate or refute pre-merger hypotheses and thus to increase the
accuracy of section 7 administration.
The Procter & Gamble case may provide a second chance for
the Supreme Court to consider the problem of post-acquisition evidence
in conglomerate merger cases.17 By the time the briefs had been
submitted to the Sixth Circuit in Procter & Gamble's appeal, Consolidated Foods had been decided. Procter & Gamble, in its brief,
contended that two sets of post-acquisition statistics "refute the contention that . . . [the merger] has or would be the cause of any lessen-

ing of competition or any tendency to monopoly in the liquid bleach
industry." " The first set of statistics illustrated that Clorox's postmerger growth continued at approximately the same pace as its premerger growth. The second set illustrated that, after the merger,
46 These standards will also operate to regulate the amount of evidence that will
have to be examined and will thus help to avoid the problems of inefficiency considered in the text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
47 The nine-year history of the Procter & Gamble case reflects the confusion over
post-acquisition evidence that has plagued the prosecution of conglomerate mergers.
The complaint against Procter & Gamble was the Commission's first major attack
against a conglomerate merger. When the hearing examiner's initial decision was
appealed by Procter & Gamble to the Commission in 1960, the case was remanded for
the gathering of additional evidence because "the record as presently constituted
does not provide an adequate basis for determining the legality of this acquisition."
Procter & Gamble Co., 58 F.T.C. 1203, 1206 (1961). The examiner was requested
to get information on "the competitive situation as it presently exists in the liquid
bleach industry." Id. at 1207. After the examiner again recommended divestiture,
the Commission upon appeal heard reargument on all contested issues of law and
fact presented by the entire record. In its opinion recommending divestiture, the
Commission stated that post-acquisition evidence is admissible only in the event of
an unusual change in the market structure or where the adverse effects of the merger
have become apparent. Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. RP. (1963-65 Transfer
Binder) 1 16,673, at 21,574 (FTC 1963). The opinion concluded: "Where, as here,
the period since the acquisition has been relatively uneventful, there is certainly no
basis for according particular weight to the post-acquisition evidence that found its
way, needlessly, into the record." Id. at 21,587. In its brief before the Sixth Circuit,
pp. 27-30, the Commission justified this change in position by referring to the Supreme
Court's emphasis on probabilities instead of actualities in two cases which had been
handed down in the interim-United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
48 Brief for Appellant, p. 74, Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th
Cir. 1966).
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Clorox's competitors had higher dollar and volume sales than ever
before.49
The court of appeals, in finding that the FTC divestiture order
was not supported by substantial evidence, stated that "the Commission
was in error in ruling that post-merger evidence was admissible only
in unusual cases and that it crept into the record needlessly in the
present case, and in giving it no weight." '0 The court also carefully
cited both sets of statistics offered by Procter & Gamble"1 and stated
that the Commission's contention of manipulation was "pure conjecture." 2 This treatment of the post-acquisition evidence was
attacked as one of the three major errors in the lower court opinion
when the FTC petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari."
Thus, the issue of the weight to be accorded post-acquisition evidence
will probably be faced by the Court again.
49 Id. at 73-80.
50 358 F.2d at 82.

51 Id. at 80, 82.
5
2Id.at 83.
53 Petition for Certiorari, pp. 11-14, FTC v. Procter & Gamble
(6th Cir.), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 897 (1966). The other alleged
court of appeals' substitution of its own prediction for those of the
the court's insistence upon proof that Procter & Gamble would in
power on behalf of Clorox.

Co., 358 F.2d 74
errors were the
Commission, and
fact exercise its

